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A QUARTERLY LA SALLE COLLEGE MAGAZINE

1980 WHAT'S AHEAD?

A SPECIAL REPORT

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CONTENTS

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

A President

Looks at His College of the Future

By Daniel W. Burke, F.S.C., Ph.D.

The issue of authority and freedom and the issue of institutional neutrality and social concern will have great impact at La Salle

Planning for the future is a human necessity and

THE PRESIDENT of the United States for the year 2001 has just recently begun his freshman year at an American college, perhaps one located near Wister Woods in Philadelphia. He (or is it she?) is only eighteen now. He will be forty-eight when he is elected in 1998. He has now begun a program in higher education which will contribute in important ways to his preparation and which will touch the destinies of billions of people in the 21st century village called Earth and Allied Planets.

The collegiate program the future President has just begun is under some serious pressures and is under some rather anxious scrutiny. The pressures are from well-known problems of the present, but also from the undeciphered problems of the future. And not the future of the 1980's, as the accompanying supplement suggests, but rather, as the future President knows well, from those of the next century.

The future has become our preoccupation. The rapid development of industrial technology, of medicine and space science particularly, has drastically revised our notions of how soon the future of science fiction will be upon us. We're not adjusted to this sudden change of pace nor to the host of other changes we are going through so rapidly. We may already be afflicted by the neurosis Alvin Toffler calls "future shock," the disorientation following the removal of familiar psychological cues of the past that helped us to function in society and a lag in adapting to the new cues.

We may not be adjusted yet to the accelerated impact of its approach, but we continue to be fascinated by the future. Our fascination is a mix of fear and horror at its inhuman possibilities (the gradually extended control of a computerized technology—or sudden, total destruction) and of hope and admiration for its potential mastery over many of man's ills. In the face of such widely diverse prospects, we feel impelled to conjecture, project, plan.

Five years ago, if I may use a local example, the College developed a ten year projection of its enrollment and finances. In a recent review, it was found to be generally sound but definitely awry in some calculations. It may have been that we did not sufficiently weigh the ever-increasing demand for education, the rise of transfer students from junior colleges, the impact of the war; we certainly did not gauge accurately the spiraling of inflation. The second edition of the study will be for a five year period. The report does illustrate, though, some of the difficulties of any attempt to analyze current trends, to project the rate of their development, to make decisions *now* about programs that will be needed *then*. Forecasting is obviously an uncertain business: a picnic has to be canceled because of unexpected rain, a campaign is lost because the Czar doesn't, as Napoleon felt sure he would, capitulate when Moscow falls. So it goes.



But the alternative to planning is ignoring the future and failing to prepare for it in some fashion—and that is more dangerous. We have to plan. It is a human necessity, especially in times of crisis. But it is also a matter of religious commitment, particularly for the Christian whose basic hope is future-oriented: Christ has died, Christ is risen, Christ will come again. A living faith has precious little room for inertia or melancholy, no room at all for despair. A living faith, too, has no room for presumption, for thinking that God will work everything out. As in other aspects of faith, we balance a paradox—working, as the saints said, as if everything depended on us, qualifying our self-reliance, however, knowing that everything depends on God.

That means that we forge plans, but limit our faith in them. We temper them with the realization that we cannot "deduce" nor forcibly develop life from an abstract model, whether it is a new curriculum or a regional development plan. We evolve plans from the signs of the present, but we know that life will constantly alter those plans in the undisclosed mystery of the future—*suddenly*, by what we call accident and chance; or *imperceptibly* by consequences and trends we only gradually become aware of; and *always* by the assorted and unpredictable difficulties and opportunities we encounter when we try to translate an idea into action. For a college founded in the middle of the Civil War, there is nothing particularly new about all of this in practice. What is new is the pressure for more imaginative and systematic planning, the general preoccupation with the future itself, the hope that a more widely-based dialogue about planning will make the probing ahead more effective.

Predicting is an attractive past-time, especially for academic people, for practically anything said within reason is difficult to criticize. But some things are clearly better bets than others. The whole trend of technological development suggests that knowledge, the production of new knowledge, will continue to have high priority. On the other hand, it is a frailer hope that the personalist values, the concern for the quality of life in youth culture will have the impact on society they deserve to have. Population statistics point to increasing numbers of students—at least until 1980. There are some, but less certain, signs that the college and university students will be more diversified, that many older people will be back in school, for continuing education, education for a second career, or just education.

The accompanying supplement suggests a number of other probabilities, based on current problems everyone is dealing with—more participation of faculty and students, expanded opportunities for minority groups, improved curricula, ef-

also a matter of religious commitment.

fective use of media (a version of *Sesame Street* for college students?), improved teaching. And doubtless some of these problems will carry over into decades beyond the eighties.

From another point of view, if we think of La Salle today as a private, church-related, urban, multipurpose college, we can look forward to its becoming very probably less private, as government aid increases; more dynamic, but also more precise, about its religious affiliation; more consciously urban in its interests and the social programs it can provide; more multipurpose in its effort to meet the needs of diverse student groups.

We could pursue any of these elements as they relate to the future; they are important. I'd like, however, to deal in more detail with two issues which I haven't mentioned yet but which, I feel, will have great impact on our future as a college—the issue of authority and freedom and the issue of institutional neutrality and social concern.

Let me get at the issue of authority in very broad terms. There are many types of authority relations in schools: in academic matters, the competence of the teacher; in organizational matters, the right of the group to achieve not simply harmony among competing interests, but a measure of growth for the community as a whole; in sports, the rules that define limits and obstacles that play achieves its pleasure by adhering to and overcoming; in matters of student discipline like living arrangements, if no longer the right of substitute parents *(in loco parentis)* to direct or restrain minors, perhaps the analogous prerogative of an advisor or person of experience in an educational situation—and, again, the rights of the community. But related to such kinds of authority are the real needs and rights of students. And the two forms of right can be adjusted and harmonized only by weighing them according to standards beyond them both—the educational purposes of the whole operation. The values of society in general and of religious commitment are reflected at that point.

It would appear—even in the experience of the last two decades—that when such values are relatively stable, when a society's pace of change and development is relatively slow, the past becomes the focus: schools educate on the authority of what has worked before. But when the pace of change accelerates, when tomorrow looks quite different from today, the focus understandably shifts to what might work in the future: the weight of authority is on something emerging. The values and structures of the past are thrown into doubt, and the felt needs of young people get much more attention than they had been getting, since it is thought they are more in tune with the future.

If there is some truth in this line of reasoning, there are also those who drive it pretty far. Assuming that youth-culture *is* the wave of the future, Margaret Mead, among others, compares the people on the other side of the generation gap to immigrants not yet adapted to their new country. As several waves of American immigrants demonstrated, older people in a new culture need their children, who more quickly establish contact, to guide them in the new ways. But, as even Dr. Mead understands, many kinds of education went on in the immigrant situation, and while parents learned some things from children, the children continued to learn much from the tradition.

And it was crucial that they continue to learn from the tradition, for the issues that tradition is concerned with are not those of one generation. Nevitt Sanford, in projecting the personal problems of the college student of the 1980's, suggested the following:

> Establishing independence of their parents, coming to terms with authority, maintaining adequate self-esteem while achieving a more or less accurate evaluation of themselves, deciding on a vocation, discovering members of the opposite sex and learning how to relate to them as individuals, adapting themselves to the requirements of student culture while revealing themselves enough to make friendships possible, and attaining a perspective on our society that will permit them to see and to oppose its ills without lapsing into cynicism or total withdrawal.

This list was derived from students Sanford had interviewed in the 1960's, but it was the same for students interviewed in the 1930's and for others in the 1950's. It would probably have been the same for students in the medieval university or the Academy of Athens. For these and a number of wider concerns—about good and evil, the just society, the human personality, God and creation—persist through the centuries, and the traditional disciplines address them. No education, therefore, can be simply future-oriented or past-oriented. The mix may vary from generation to generation, but both components are necessary.

I see the College in need of several things, if it is to achieve a viable balance of the past and future concerns; and, more particularly, if it is to have the clearer bases of authority, it will need:

—A continuing and lively dialogue about the future and its impact on programs here, in classroom and committee, but in quadrangle and cafeteria as well.
—A sense of sharing in dialogue itself as an educational experience. While we have had several excellent develop-

"If a society is to continue, it is clear that each new generation must assume

ments along these lines in recent years, we have also had some good ideas that faltered as we tried to translate them into continuing patterns—departmental boards or a simplified student government structure, for example. But these ideas—student-generated—are still being pressed and new ones are being added, the weekend academies for faculty and students, for example.

—A re-examination (already begun by the Curriculum Committee) of the curriculum, particularly the rather structured distribution requirements which channel a good bit of the traditional learning. The questions being asked are, for example, whether the real issues of the tradition (or of the future) are being addressed effectively or whether, with greater flexibility, there might also be added elements of better integration.

—A widening of the role played by adults in the higher educational process, more contacts with happy and successful people in a variety of roles other than the academic. Lecture programs, expanded programs with alumni are providing some of this; more is needed.

I've spoken at some length about authority and not much about freedom. I hope that is less a matter of the mood these days than of the exigencies of this article. But if only a word can be said on the other term, it might be that there is some value in *not* thinking of authority and freedom as simply opposites. The sad thing is that authority is so often thought of as simply a restriction on freedom or, at best, a protection for it ("law and order") rather than as an instrument toward it ("bring us together," as pathetic as that phrase may sound now, was addressed to the chief executive). After Marcuse we know more clearly that oppression, the pressures and limitations on our freedoms, are varied and subtle. And the black man especially still shoulders the kind of indignity that no legislation or social program can reach, the failure of acceptance that can be given only among human persons (who are "free at last") in respect and love.

If the bases of authority must be clarified for the future, the ways to freedom must also be rectified—and not simply by the frequent, simplistic striking down of external restraint and rule. The paths to the greater freedoms are still within the person—a settled sense of values, self-reliance, a balance of control and flexibility that enables one to act maturely amid the oppressive variety of options modern culture has created for us. These are the kinds of freedom one tries to state as educational goals of a College.

The end of my allotted space is approaching, and I want to say something here about another key issue—about what the functions of a college are, about the relation of its general academic responsibility to educate young people, to its duty of assisting society with more specific current problems. If a society is to continue, it is clear that each new generation must assume responsibility for it. And educators, among other duties, are charged with leading young people to assume that responsibility. "The teacher's qualification consists in knowing the world," says Hannah Arendt, "and being able to instruct others about it, but his authority rests on his assumption of responsibility for that world. *Vis-à-vis* the child it is as though he were a representative of all adult inhabitants, pointing out the details and saying to the child: This is our world."

This is our world. Younger people have seen clearly enough that it is *a* world, a world which they are quite knowledgeable about, but which many do not find to their liking. What they claim to see less clearly, however, is a world the responsibility for which *has* been assumed by the average citizen, the teacher, or the academic institution. And while the more active and vocal student these days may feel that the institution should cut back even further the forms of authority within its own community, he paradoxically urges further extension of its authority into the community. He urges the institution to take on specific social action programs and take moral stands on current issues.

This confusion arises, however, not simply from the unrealistic moral fervor of the young, but also from academe's own confused notions about its functions—and, more specifically, from its frequent failure to do well what it should be doing. Several decades of more substantial accomplishment in the research and study of the history, politics, and languages of southeast Asia would have put the universities and colleges in an infinitely better position to contribute to the solution of *the* problem than the flurry of ineffectual activism in recent years has.

Each discipline, despite the enormous range of possible knowledge in modern times, tries to establish some sense of what the important questions are for its study. But failure here is reflected in the constantly growing heap of trivial scholarship, of work that gives little indication that the disci-

responsibility for it."

pline knows what is important for itself or the students it attempts to train. I think one of the first responsibilities the teacher has is to demonstrate to the younger mind that he has shouldered the task which the discipline is attempting, that he is concerned for the significant and important questions relevant to the discipline in purely scholarly and academic terms.

"In purely scholarly and academic terms"—In that direction, however, lies a second failure: the pretense that scholarship can be cultivated in a vacuum which excludes other human values; that it has no assumptions which relate to more ultimate philosophical or religious questions; that it excludes responsibility for its technological and other practical applications. It is to the credit of students that they have spearheaded the challenge here—even though that challenge has not been directed as precisely as it might have been. For the paradox is that the university must remain neutral, if it is to be free; that its disciplines, if they are to be academic, must seek to abstract their questions from other values—but realize they are abstracting; that it must give primacy to its academic and cultural enterprise (except in the most extreme crises), if it is to make the long-range contribution to society it is designed for. But, at the same time, it has to recognize the importance of all human values and the way they influence and shape its more purely intellectual work. And, more particularly, its individual members as human persons, have to be committed to these values.

The College's *Handbook* made the point some ten-years ago in discussing the way the teacher must strive to balance his professional interests and personal commitments:

> It is in a mutual concern for a subject-matter that the teacher's fundamental relationship with his students exists. While this attention provides an important common ground for teacher and student, it also creates the sphere within which the more general influences of the educator on the younger mind must be exercised. It is here, therefore, that the teacher must display and the student must learn enthusiasm for the true values of life and the wisdom that can give them their proper hierarchy. It is here, too, that the teacher must discharge certain of his duties to the College and to the societies of which it is a part.
>
> Hence, it is incumbent upon the teacher to demonstrate his commitment to these values, especially to the value of truth. Ultimately, he must witness to his religious faith, a faith which is fundamental to his response to all other values and which can in no way conflict with them. While the teacher is free, therefore, to pursue research in the calm conviction that there can be no final conflict between revealed truth and the truth of human discovery, and while he is free to communicate the results of his study in his classes, he is guided by a sense of professional responsibility and prudence in discussing controversial issues, in avoiding the temptation to propagandize for any ideology, in taking care not to dogmatize where new truth is constantly being discovered or of giving the impression that revealed truth is not open to every deeper understanding. He will, in a word, be guided in his exercise of academic freedom by the realization that La Salle College is an American and a Roman Catholic institution of higher learning.

Is it too much to say that because of the failure of apathetic teachers, administrators, and students to discharge their human duties as individual citizens and as concerned members of society, that the institution is being pressed to take on involvements which in the long run will be inimical to its basic mission?

The "long run" has been our concern here. Everything the future holds—whether for himself or his institutions—no man knows. But man in this generation is, perhaps, closer than any other to the power, not only of planning, but also of creating some aspects of his future. That is an exhilarating and a terrible power. We need new wisdom and moral strength to use it properly—and we need the same qualities to solve our problems of authority and freedom and of institutional neutrality and personal commitment. ■

Brother Burke became La Salle's 25th President in June, 1969 after having served as the college's vice president for academic affairs for the previous eight years. He holds bachelor's, master's and doctor's degrees in English from Catholic University. He has contributed to many scholarly journals and periodicals.

Can our most serious domestic problems be solved by the Local, State and Federal Governments?

PEACE, PROSPERITY and OUR

PREDICTING ELECTIONS for my students, which has been a pastime for many years, isn't that difficult. Assessing the political situation from the vantage point of a week before the voters go to the polls is a simple task compared to the assignment of playing Criswell, and discussing what the political developments of the Seventies will be.

The first problem is to determine which of the many possibilities should be included within the space limitations imposed. However, without attempting any hierarchy of significance, we will discuss some of the most likely developments of political import.

The most enduring aspect of the American political system is the dynamic nature of its evolutionary development. The changes during the next decade will continue to be evolutionary in nature. The revolutionary advocates are not going to command the support to achieve their goal of revolution and a complete restructuring of American political institutions and way of life. Dissent, however, has always been an important ingredient in American politics and will continue to be so. We must not expect that the solution of today's problems, if it were possible, will produce Utopia. Life is a struggle to solve old, present, and yet unrecognized problems. Our goal will not be and should not be the elimination of dissent. Our goal has been and will continue to be the peaceful solution of problems, not the stifling of discussion.

The United States will get out of Southeast Asia as an active military participant early in the 1970's, and the government will avoid becoming involved in similar military ventures during this decade. This does not mean, however, that the U. S. will no longer be interested in exerting its power and influence in the international community, but, rather, the thrust of its activities will be differently implemented. Nor could this country withdraw from the international arena even if it wanted to—its power position in the world community makes it a necessary participant whether it is disinclined to become involved or not.

Our own best interests and those of the international community require our prudent concern and active involvement. Peace is our objective and peace will continue to be our objective; however, the maintenance of peace does not mean the absence of all international problems and tensions, but, rather, the settling of these issues without resort to military force.

Cities will continue to present our most serious domestic problems — politically, economically, and socially. Law and order which had racists overtones for many in the 60's will lose that connotation and revert to its real meaning and will be of concern to all people regardless of race, color or creed. The safety of the city streets, the protection of property, the ability to move from place to place without fear at any hour of the day or night will receive increased attention.

Security measures will increase, new techniques will be employed, and in selected areas, we can expect to witness the return of the "cop on the beat" with his personal relationships making an important contribution in order to augment the activities of the impersonal mechanized force which has proved incapable of performing adequately the tasks which have to be done. The patrol car possesses mobility, but lacks humanity. This element will be returned with the less mobile but more personal Conservator Of the Peace on the beat. The increased expenditure to achieve law and order will be considerable, but a small price compared to the benefits received. People in the 70's will vote for the man who will promise this type of safety, and reelect him if he can fulfill that promise.

During this decade the voting age will be lowered, but the political impact will be much less than the advocates of this change anticipate and predict. Only those under twenty-one who are interested politically will participate and from the experience with woman's suffrage; we can be certain that this participation will be a disappointing development for the leaders of this movement. The 21 to 30 age group has one of the lowest percentages of participation in elections at the present time; however, this group will soon be replaced by the 18 to 21 age group.

1980

POLITICAL SYSTEM

By Robert J. Courtney, Ph.D.

It takes time to develop the habit of political participation. Before this habit can be cultivated, political interests must be generated. To generate political interest. the eligible participants must recognize the importance and significance of political activity. The atomization of 18 to 21 year age interests mitigate against the possible political concerns of these young men and women. This political interest will be even more difficult to engender during the next decade than it would have been during the 50's and 60's as the demands of the military draft diminishes and as the armed forces move more toward a more voluntary constituency.

The diverse concerns of youth will divert their energies in myriad directions. Those who feel compelled to participate will do so, and political parties will adjust their organizations to include members of this age group in party councils. However, the impact will not be great, and the leaders of another worthy cause will find frustration at the end of the rainbow.

Women have had legal political equality for a couple of generations, but complete equality will not be forthcoming during the Seventies. Their special treatment in many areas of the law will endure. The woman's equal rights principles will be implemented in the economic sphere of job opportunities and equal pay for equal work. The overwhelming majority of women are not interested in complete equality, and will oppose, if necessary, any attempts to make them equally liable for alimony, child support, military service and the elimination of other special privilege areas enjoyed by women today.

The participation of women in politics as candidates for office and top

administrative positions will increase. There will be more women councilmen, more women mayors, more senators and representatives on both the state and national level.

A woman in the Cabinet is not new; Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed the first woman in 1933. However, Eisenhower was the only President to follow suit; we can expect to see another woman in the Cabinet this decade, and more women in high administrative posts will become an accepted practice by the 80's.

By the end of the decade, both major parties will give serious consideration to the possibility of having a woman as a Vice Presidential candidate. Women have had their names placed before the Convention in previous years, but these were only token gestures and recognized by everyone as such. Even Senator Margaret Chase Smith's so-called serious bid for the Presidential nomination was recognized for its symbolic value only. This will change. Women will be given more serious consideration, and when one party makes the move, the other will follow in order not to alienate the female vote. The country is not ready for a woman presidential candidate and won't be during the 70's, and THE woman vice presidential candidate is not on the horizon; however, the spawning grounds are more fertile than ever, and we should be able to get a glimpse of her by 1980.

The Electoral College will survive yet another attack. For decades now, the one item in the Constitution nearly everyone agrees should be changed is the method of electing the President and Vice President. Why then has this provision survived? Very simply, it is the fact that a sufficient number of people cannot agree on a substitute. There are many political unknowns in the proposals advanced as alternatives. Most people are fearful of venturing into the unknown, and not the least among these are the politicians who have to make the decision and then try to live with it. What effect will any of these alternatives have on the two party system?—the political power of the individual states?—the large states?—the small states?—the campaign strategy?—the financial burdens of campaigns?—and many more. There are plenty of questions to keep us busy for another decade at least.

The government will continue to play an important role in the life of each person. The government will become more involved in the social and economic fabric of society. More laws will be enacted to bring about greater distribution of the wealth; more businesses and industries will come under stricter supervision and control.

The national government will take over the major interstate railroads, and local governing transportation authorities will own and operate the commuter lines. The general public, through taxes, will subsidize mass

transit as the crisis in this area continues to develop. Private enterprise will no longer be interested in mass transportation and the government will become responsible almost by default. Commuter service will be improved. Highways can never be built fast enough to provide uncongested travel during peak hours, and even if they could, their desirability would be questionable on several grounds, e.g., efficiency, economy. More people will be leaving the car at home as workers are captured by the new and more agreeable features of speed, safety, relaxation, and moderate cost.

Governments need continual organizational adjustments. Through the years, revisions of structure, consolidation and/or separation of functions, and in some instances comprehensive constitutional reorganization have resulted. The Seventies will see a continuation of this activity in a number of our state governments as they attempt to overcome the restrictive provisions of the 19th Century in their attempt to catch up with the 70's in the 20th Century.

The power of the Governor will continue to increase at the expense of the Legislature as the people come to realize that governments need action not inaction. Administrators will be given greater discretionary powers in their field as the legislators recognize that the only sensible approach to policy-making is to set the general limits of authority and understand that detailed proposals are an unrealistic attempt to retain administrative discretion in an unwieldly and cumbersome legislative process.

The last place that state government reorganization will occur is in the Legislatures themselves. The political power structure in these bodies makes significant reform virtually impossible, and the people are not that interested in this aspect of reorganization anyway. When Pennsylvania held its limited Constitutional Convention a few years ago an opportunity existed for important legislative reorganization, but the issue was never seriously considered. Most observers knew that the political interests were well protected in the Convention, and that little would be done. There were a few editorials, but no popular concern for this issue. Without popular interest, the Legislatures will remain in the 19th Century.

Local governments, on the other hand, have been making steady progress toward improving performance and will continue to do so. The old concept of local government officials transacting the affairs of the community on a part-time basis is virtually a thing of the past. During this century, one of the most significant developments in local government has been the emergence of the trained, non-partisan, professional administrator or manager. The success of this innovation has been outstanding and the growth of the movement undiminished. The professional administrator is here to stay. As local communities grow in size, the people realized that part-time government is a luxury which they can no longer afford.

The 70's will continue to emphasize increased professionalization on all levels of government, especially at the state level which has lagged far behind the national government and many of the larger local governments in this respect. The costs of inefficiency are becoming too high to tolerate much longer, and important inroads on this improficiency which exists can be minimized by establishing and enforcing standards of employment—the substitution of the merit system for the patronage system.

The merit system, while better than patronage, will continue with all of its faults throughout the next decade. It will still be virtually impossible to dismiss submarginal employees as well as most incompetents because of the built-in protective mechanisms which exist. It was no doubt true that many of these protections were desirable and necessary in the formative years of the system's development, but now they should be subjected to serious scrutiny. This, of course, will not be done because the special interests can exert sufficient political pressure to make any significant legislative action impossible.

Another aspect of reorganization which will be given increased attention and wider discussion is the movement toward government consolidation. Considerable School District consolidation has already taken place during the last three decades, but the new thrust will focus on the consolidation of the proliferation of the many Authorities and Special Districts—the fastest growing form of governing units today.

There are Recreation Districts, Transportation Authorities, Conservation Districts, and the list could go on. The multiplicity of these units, their overlapping boundaries, their myopic concerns complicate an already complicated crazy-quilt of local governing authority. I do not expect that much will be done to correct this situation in the 70's. However, people will become aware of the problem and discussions will involve more than a handful of people—mainly political scientists—who see this as one of the areas of concern for the future. When this concern is developed in the 70's some action could be forthcoming in the 80's—nothing startling, simply a beginning.

With the total impact of government becoming greater, the discussion of freedom will continue and will become an ever more important factor for our consideration and deliberation. Each new piece of legislation, each new administrative decision, each new levy must be carefully weighed in the light of freedom. As the government expands its power and influence, the bounds of freedom may be pushed back a little further each time; however, the level of freedom may also diminish in the process. Thus, freedom has two important dimensions which must be closely observed as we move into the next decade. The citizen should evaluate all government activities with these two factors in mind—the scope and level of freedom in our society.

The success of the 70's will depend in the final analysis on how well we handle this most important of all elements in our system. The citizen must be constantly aware of the possible erosion of freedom. Law and order can be achieved in a martial state, but wouldn't the concomitant loss of freedom make the price too high? Political, economic and social development must be achieved within the context of freedom.

This will be the challenge of the 70's. ■

Dr. Courtney, '41, a professor of political science at La Salle, is President of the college's Faculty Senate. He holds advanced degrees from Niagara University and the University of Pennsylvania and has been a member of the La Salle staff since 1946.

1980

Must The World Fight OVERPOPULATION or POPULATION CONTROL?

A La Salle Sociologist assesses some local, national and international trends.

By John F. Connors, Ph.D.

As The Seventies began, the ecological crusade brought the question of overpopulation into prominence on the campuses and in the mass media. Pollution, congestion and famine were seen as the rapidly approaching consequences of irresponsible procreation, human pollution. According to one national columnist, the coed who publicly renounces motherhood for the good of mankind and nature is the new campus hero.

While the ecological crusade brought intense, young disciples into the ranks of those working for population control, this fresh impetus built on a base of growing strength and success for the birth control movement during the sixtes. This was a decade of widening acceptance of the pill and then of widespread misgivings about it. It was the decade of public debate among Catholics about the morality of contraception, debate stimulated by Vatican II and climaxed by the encyclical, *On Human Life*.

Following an exchange on the place of contraception in the foreign aid program among Adlai Stevenson, Dwight Eisenhower and J. F. Kennedy, the United States moved from a cautious position to open assistance in family planning under Lyndon Johnson. The decade saw expanding use of public facilities and funds to spread the word of family limitation to the poor in the cities of the United States and to disseminate the appliances thereunto appertaining. This engendered fireworks as Catholic leaders in some places, including Pennsylvania, did battle with state and federal programs.

The birth control tide has moved beyond the issue of contraception. New York state, where Catholics are assumed to have some political clout, has passed a liberal abortion law; and Catholic leaders in Pennsylvania and New Jersey are fighting to prevent passage of a similar law. Finally, in 1968, the birth rate of the United States reached an all-time low of 17.5 per thousand, slightly below the lowest birth rates during the depression of the thirties. The decline in childbearing has been greatest among Americans in their early twenties, whose fertility has in the past been high. So the fresh concern about population comes at a time when family limitation has become an established fact.

Population scholars have learned from the wreckage of past ventures into prophecy the hazards of forecasting. However, I will attempt a perspective on population trends during the sixties, a tentative examination of population in 1970 for which most of the data is preliminary, and some nervous, well hedged statements about population trends and their human consequences. This will be attempted in three widening circles; for Philadelphia, for the United States, and for the world.

The article is definitely not a call to action, to procreate or to stop procreating, to fight overpopulation or to fight population control. There are so many causes crying for partisans that it is not my intention to provoke the reader to enter the population melee.

According to a release of the Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission, the nine county area (Philadelphia, Bucks, Delaware, Montgomery and Chester counties in Pennsylvania and Burlington, Gloucester, Camden and Mercer in New Jersey) grew by 10% in the last decade, well below the national rate of 14%. Ecological warriors will bless the difference and regret that the rate for metropolis and nation was not zero; others will equate growth with economic vitality and take this as an unhappy omen. The whole megalopolis from above Boston to below Washington will probably show a growth rate below the national average and so a declining share of the nation's population. Greater Boston grew only 5% from 1960 to 1970.

Within the Delaware Valley Region a most significant demographic fact, challenged by Mayor Tate, is that Philadelphia appears to have declined somewhat in population, falling below the two million mark. Populaton decrease was greater in the industrial suburbs of Chester and Camden than it was in Philadelphia; the harshest challenge in urban revitalization may lie in suburbs such as these across the country, the Garys, Newarks, and Oaklands, which share the problems of the central cities but do not possess the power the central cities can still muster.

—continued

Some scholars argue that more coercive measures may to end the population growth.



Falling numbers in a growing metropolitan area means that the city of Philadelphia now has a much smaller proportion of the inhabitants of the metropolitan area than it did ten years ago, about 38% of the area's over 5 million residents. This is part of a national trend whch was evident in the 1960 census. The city of Boston, admittedly an extreme case, now contains less than a quarter of the residents of the Boston Metropolitan area.

An urban sociologist at Northwestern University pointed out that the sprawl of metropolitan areas beyond the political boundaries of the city is seen as a problem only by professional planners and behavioral scientists, that for the great majority of the urbanites it represents a better level and style of living, something they would not reverse. Decreasing numbers in the city proper means decreasing density, and density has been viewed as a prime cause of the ills of the city.

Still, the low and falling proportion of the people in greater Philadelphia who live in the city poses some difficulties in the social and political life of the city. It seems likely that it means decreased influence in state and national governments. The migration to the suburbs has been selective; the poor, the blacks, and the elderly are more likely to stay behind.

An urban sociologist at the University of Wisconsin computed an index of suburbanization to show for American cities the precise extent to which the wealthy and the better educated are concentrated in the suburbs rather than in the central city. Philadelphia showed a greater concentration of the prosperous and college educated in the suburbs and of the poor and the dropouts in the city than any other major city in the study.

The data for 1970 are not yet available, but they are likely to show an intensification of this inbalance between the city of Philadelphia and its suburbs. Whether in 1980 the city-suburban gap in resources will have widened still further depends on several things, e.g., the success of urban renewal, an abating of violent crime, the quality of education in the city's public schools and improvement in the pattern of race relations.

Along with the shift of families in the metropolitan areas to suburbia has come an equally heavy migration of black families from the rural South into the nation's largest urban centers. There has been a concentration of black families in these metropolitan areas in the political center cities. Figures from the 1970 census are not available but the unofficial guess of some city officials is that the proportion of the inhabitants of Philadelphia proper who are non-white is in the vicinity of 35 per cent, compared to 27 per cent in 1960. The proportion of the residents of the entire Philadelphia metropolitan area who are non-white has risen much more slowly, from 16 per cent in 1960 to perhaps 18 per cent in 1970.

Projection or guessing from an unknown base point for 1970 to the percentage of city and metropolis that will be non-white in 1980 is too shaky for this author to attempt. It seems likely however that by 1980 there will be a further appreciable rise in the proportion of the city proper which is non-white and a much smaller increase in the proportion non-white in the entire metropolitan area. This will be affected by the progress of urban renewal, by the vitality of public and Catholic education, by the extent to which the newer parts of the suburbs are truly open to black families wishing to buy in them.

Some thirteen years ago, Morton Grodzins, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, projected a picture of predominantly black central cities and heavily white suburbs in our large metropolitan areas. Philadelphia may well be moving toward this at the present time, although we might conceivably move toward a truly integrated city and suburbs. If we do continue to move toward the Grodzins model of black city and white suburbs, a crucial question is whether the pattern will be one of central city which is an economic desert or a central city of nearly equal economic stature with the suburbs; a central city treated as a parish by hostile suburbanites or a central city cooperating with and respected by these suburbs.

It is tempting to follow the pessimism of the time and predict the wasteland model, but the question defies answering now. The answer will depend on such things as mutual respect and forebearance between the police and the black community, on the manner in which our rising real income per capita is distributed within the society, and on the leadership, black and white, of the city and nation. The combination of suburbanization, black concentration in the cities, and rising aspirations, frustration and anger among blacks has produced a challenge to La Salle and to other urban institutions.

We face the duty and the practical need of working with leaders and residents of the neighborhood near us and with metropolitan leaders to achieve justice for both blacks and low-income whites, to examine intelligently their grievances, fears and needs, and to help achieve a deescalation of the violence and the rhetoric which can quickly end in destruction

be necessary

and repression. Through the activities of Urban Studies and Community Services Center and various individuals on campus, La Salle has done some things to meet this need.

Moving to the national scene we find that the population grew more slowly during the sixties than it had during the fifties. Still some 25 million people were added. If the present rate of increase of one per cent per year should continue through the seventies, the country will grow even more slowly than in the sixties and the population will rise from 204 million to about 225 million. Whether this rate of growth of one per cent persists seems to hinge on our ability to avoid involvement in global war and on the health of the economy. If the one per cent growth rate does not continue through the seventies it seems likely that the actual rate will be lower rather than higher.

This guess is hesitantly projected from the increasing availability of legal abortion on demand, a rising divorce rate, decreasing influence and practice of organized religion, rising levels of education and growing employment of women. An end to the war and the draft, a high level of prosperity through the decade and a reversal of some of the trends just listed just might raise the growth rate.

Some population experts, e.g., Kingsley Davis and Lincoln and Alice Day, favor more vigorous and immediate concentration on the goal of zero population growth. Jean Mayer of the Harvard University Department of Nutrition looks at 48 billion rustproof cans and 26 billion non-degradable bottles produced and discarded here annually and at 800 million pounds of waste produced daily and concludes that to save the ecology of our increasingly affluent nation the population must be decreased as income per capita increases.

Paul and Ann Erlich, biologists at Stanford, concur with Mayer that zero population increase is an insufficient goal; existing numbers in the country and the world must be cut back. Means proposed to reach zero increase or actual decrease include abolishing or reversing the tax advantages given to married people and parents, an end to fellowships and assistantships in universities for married students, free abortions, abolishing job discrimination against women and bonuses for late marriage, for prolonged childlessness in marriage and for acceptance of sterilization. Some of these scholars indicate that if voluntary and indirect measures do not end the population growth more coercive measures may be necessary.

A Princeton economist and demographer, Ansley Coale looked at the same babies, beer cans and traffic congestion that Jean Mayer saw and concluded that while a goal of zero population growth in the future is inevitable the costs of a crash program to achieve it quickly for the United States would be too high. Writing with a lack of grimness and with a sense of humor rare among scientists, particularly demographers, Coale argued that population growth is only one cause of overcrowding and pollution, that voluntary measures to reduce fertility (including the availability of abortion) are appropriate for the United States now, and that by the time the nation organizes a campaign to lessen fertility, its programs may have to be reversed to try to increase fertility to avoid a declining population.

The fertility of Catholics, of Negroes and of poorer, less educated people has been higher than that of non-Catholics, of whites and of more prosperous and educated people in the United States, though the data is less clear on religion than it is on race and class. This higher fertility has apparently contributed to a slowly rising proportion of Catholics, now about one in four of the nation, and of Negroes, now one in nine. In the case of the poor it has probably contributed to some deepening of their poverty through a lower per capita income and to a fear among eugenicists that our genetic pool is deteriorating.

As birth rates fell from 1957 to 1968 the Catholic birth rate appears to have fallen more slowly at first than that for non-Catholics, thus widening the gap between Catholic and non-Catholic fertility. By the middle of the sixties Catholic fertility was falling at the same rate as non-Catholic fertility; by the end of the decade, somewhat faster. A research team from Brown studied a sample of wives in Rhode Island in the spring of 1968 shortly before Pope Paul's somewhat controversial encyclical and again a month after the encyclical. The proportion of Catholic wives approving a contraception was 10 per cent higher in the second sample than in the first sample. Chance fluctuation from sampling? Probably not. Feminine negativism? Maybe. Possibly also, the encyclical and the immediate and adverse reaction to it by many Catholic theologians served as a catalyst for change away from the traditional rule.

A study of the sexual and family values of the young, unmarried people, undertaken by some of my students before the encyclical but completed after its publication showed that 76 per cent of the Catholic men and 64 per cent of the Catholic women found contraception acceptable in marriage. In the years following World War II Catholics who were



college graduates were more likely than other Catholics to use rhythm instead of contraceptives and to want a large family. A recently published study by a demographer from Princeton and another from Catholic University showed that the increase in use of contraception by Catholics was greatest among the college educated. In all, it appears that the modest differences in fertility which have existed between Catholics and Protestants will diminish during the 1970's. Differences in fertility between whites and non-whites and between business and professional families on one hand and manual workers on the other remained large through the 1960's with no narrowing of the relative gap between them visible to this writer. Scholars have predicted the leveling of these differences for many years. Whether they will narrow appreciably in the 70's under the impact of such things as publicly sponsored contraception programs, this sociologist would prefer to wait and see rather than to estimate now.

Despite the pill, the illegitimacy ratio rose substantially during the 1960's; in 1968, one in nineteen white infants and three in ten non-whites were recorded as illegitimate. An increased proportion of these illegitimate births were to white rather than non-white women. Life expectancy increased by nearly a year from 1960 to 1968, especially among non-whites and women.

The most critical population pressures do not exist in greater Philadelphia or in the United States but in the developing nations of the world. The world grew from some 3.0 billion people in 1960 to about 3.6 billion in 1970. It is growing now at a rate of approximately 1.9 per cent a year, a rate that will bring the population to 4.4 billion if it continues. There are grounds for hope that this rate is falling and it can fall without widespread famine or major war, but there is no certainty that this will happen in the next ten years.

I remember telling a population class in my first year of teaching that the world's population was growing at the remarkable rate of 1 per cent a year and that while this would double the population in sixty-three years the rate would almost certainly fall. Fifteen years later these rates had risen almost 2 per cent.

William and Paul Paddock in *Famine 1975* hold that in this decade, catastrophic famine with accompanying revolution and turmoil will sweep much of Asia. Africa and Latin America. And it is already too late; the catastrophe, they say, is inevitable. When one looks at China's population, perhaps 750 million in 1970 and growing by about 10 million a year, or at India's approximately 550 millions increasing by some 11 million a year, the possibility of major famine seems real enough. Countries in Latin America and the Near East with low levels of living for the average family are growing by 2.5 to 3.5 per cent a year.

Disastrous famine does not seem inevitable. Frank Notestein, president emeritus of the Population Council, recognizes the possibility of severe famine and of world war but still finds reasons for optimism that the world can increase production and curb population growth so that it can provide better nutrition for 6.7 billion people in 2000 A.D. than it does for its occupants today. Gunnar Myrdal, surveying Asia and Latin America, also sees the possibility of increasing poverty, hunger and unrest in this decade, but he sees options for increasing production and controlling fertility and so improving human conditions.

Per capita income appears to be rising in the great majority of countries in the world, though the gap between the rich and poor nations is probably widening. World food production has been increasing slightly faster than population. Population control programs are underway in many underdeveloped countries and some are showing results. China's leaders have, in fact if not in words, abandoned orthodox Marxist doctrine and are promoting population control by contraception, sterilization, permissiveness on abortion, and delayed marriage. Chile and Colombia have initiated population control programs; Mexico has declined to do so. In the developed countries farm production is curtailed to cope with the problem of surpluses.

Much of the problem is not whether we can meet the challenge but whether we will. Some underdeveloped countries have devoted much of their energies to the military and to national glory. Hundreds of millions of dollars will be spent in this decade on war and preparation for war. We in the United States have cut back on foreign aid and defoliated the rice bowl of Southeast Asia. The resources are present for increasing production and for population control, but the practical problems of freeing some of these resources are undeniably complicated.

Urban decay, racial tension, abortion, rising rates of divorce and illegitimacy, catastrophic famine, perhaps nuclear war!

It is understandable that many Americans grip their beer cans firmly and retreat to the den.

There is hope that the grimest predictions will prove to be too pessimistic and that the future will be somewhat better than the present hope.

But no money-back guarantee! ■

Dr. Connors, an associate professor of sociology at La Salle, received his degrees at Mount St. Mary's College and Catholic U. He has been a member of the college staff since 1955 and teaches courses in population, the city and social change.



1980!

In the decade between now and then, our colleges and universities must face some large and perplexing issues

NINETEEN EIGHTY! A few months ago the date had a comforting remoteness about it. It was detached from today's reality; too distant to worry about. But now, with the advent of a new decade, 1980 suddenly has become the next milepost to strive for. Suddenly, for the nation's colleges and universities and those who care about them, 1980 is not so far away after all.



1980! BETWEEN NOW AND THEN, our colleges and universities will have more changes to make, more major issues to confront, more problems to solve, more demands to meet, than in any comparable period in their history. In 1980 they also will have:

► **More students to serve**—an estimated 11.5-million, compared to some 7.5-million today.

► **More professional staff members to employ**—a projected 1.1-million, compared to 785,000 today.

► **Bigger budgets to meet**—an estimated $39-billion in uninflated, 1968-69 dollars, nearly double the number of today.

► **Larger salaries to pay**—$16,532 in 1968-69 dollars for the average full-time faculty member, compared to $11,595 last year.

► **More library books to buy**—half a billion dollars' worth, compared to $200-million last year.

► **New programs that are not yet even in existence**—with an annual cost of $4.7-*billion*.

Those are careful, well-founded projections, prepared by one of the leading economists of higher education, Howard R. Bowen. Yet they are only one indication of what is becoming more and more evident in every respect, as our colleges and universities look to 1980:

No decade in the history of higher education—not even the eventful one just ended, with its meteoric record of growth—has come close to what the Seventies are shaping up to be.

1980! BEFORE THEY CAN GET THERE, the colleges and universities will be put to a severe test of their resiliency, resourcefulness, and strength.

No newspaper reader or television viewer needs to be told why. Many colleges and universities enter the Seventies with a burdensome inheritance: a legacy of dissatisfaction, unrest, and disorder on their campuses that has no historical parallel. It will be one of the great issues of the new decade.

Campus disruptions: a burning issue for the Seventies

Last academic year alone, the American Council on Education found that 524 of the country's 2,342 institutions of higher education experienced disruptive campus protests. The consequences ranged from the occupation of buildings at 275 institutions to the death of one or more persons at eight institutions. In the first eight months of 1969, an insurance-industry clearinghouse reported, campus disruptions caused $8.9-million in property damage.

Some types of colleges and universities were harder-hit than others—but no type except private two-year colleges escaped completely. (*See the table at left for the American Council on Education's breakdown of disruptive and violent protests, according to the kinds of institution that underwent them.*)

Last year's record	Had disruptive protests	Had violent protests
Public universities	43.0%	13.1%
Private universities	70.5%	34.4%
Public 4-yr colleges	21.7%	8.0%
Private nonsectarian 4-yr colleges.	42.6%	7.3%
Protestant 4-yr colleges	17.8%	1.7%
Catholic 4-yr colleges	8.5%	2.6%
Private 2-yr colleges	0.0%	0.0%
Public 2-yr colleges	10.4%	4.5%

Harold Hodgkinson, of the Center for Research and Development in Higher Education at the University of California, studied more than 1,200 campuses and found another significant fact: the bigger an institution's enrollment, the greater the likelihood that disruptions took place. For instance:

► Of 501 institutions with fewer than 1,000 students, only 14 per cent reported that the level of protest had increased on their campuses over the past 10 years.

► Of 32 institutions enrolling between 15,000 and 25,000 students, 75 per cent reported an increase in protests.

► Of 9 institutions with more than 25,000 students, all but one reported that protests had increased.

This relationship between enrollments and protests, Mr. Hodgkinson discovered, held true in both the public and the private colleges and universities:

No campus in any region is really 'safe' from protest

"The public institutions which report an increase in protest have a mean size of almost triple the public institutions that report no change in protest," he found. "The nonsectarian institutions that report increased protest are more than twice the size of the nonsectarian institutions that report no change in protest."

Another key finding: among the faculties at protest-prone institutions, these characteristics were common: "interest in research, lack of interest in teaching, lack of loyalty to the institution, and support of dissident students."

Nor—contrary to popular opinion—were protests confined to one or two parts of the country (imagined by many to be the East and West Coasts). Mr. Hodgkinson found no region in which fewer than 19 per cent of all college and university campuses had been hit by protests.

"It is very clear from our data," he reported, "that, although some areas have had more student protest than others, there is no 'safe' region of the country."



1980! WHAT WILL BE THE PICTURE by the end of the decade? Will campus disruptions continue—and perhaps spread—throughout the Seventies? No questions facing the colleges and universities today are more critical, or more difficult to answer with certainty.

Some ominous reports from the high schools

On the dark side are reports from hundreds of high schools to the effect that "the colleges have seen nothing, yet." The National Association of Secondary School Principals, in a random survey, found that 59 per cent of 1,026 senior and junior high schools had experienced some form of student protest last year. A U.S. Office of Education official termed the high school disorders "usually more precipitous,



spontaneous, and riotlike" than those in the colleges. What such rumblings may presage for the colleges and universities to which many of the high school students are bound, one can only speculate.

Even so, on many campuses, there is a guarded optimism. "I know I may have to eat these words tomorrow," said a university official who had served with the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, "but I think we may have turned the corner." Others echo his sentiments.

"If anything," said a dean who almost superstitiously asked that he not be identified by name, "the campuses may be meeting their difficulties with greater success than is society generally—despite the scare headlines.

"The student dissatisfactions are being dealt with, constructively, on many fronts. The unrest appears to be producing less violence and more *reasoned* searches for remedies—although I still cross my fingers when saying so."

Some observers see another reason for believing that the more destructive forms of student protest may be on the wane. Large numbers of students, including many campus activists, appear to have been alienated this year by the violent tactics of extreme radicals. And deep divisions have occurred in Students for a Democratic Society, the radical organization that was involved in many earlier campus disruptions.

In 1968, the radicals gained many supporters among moderate students as a result of police methods in breaking up some of their demonstrations. This year, the opposite has occurred. Last fall, for example, the extremely radical "Weatherman" faction of Students for a Democratic Society deliberately set out to provoke a violent police reaction in Chicago by smashing windows and attacking bystanders. To the Weathermen's disappointment, the police were so restrained that they won the praise of many of their former critics—and not only large numbers of moderate students, but even a number of campus SDS chapters, said they had been "turned off" by the extremists' violence.

The president of the University of Michigan, Robben Fleming, is among those who see a lessening of student enthusiasm for the extreme-radical approach. "I believe the violence and force will soon pass, because it has so little support within the student body," he told an interviewer. "There is very little student support for violence of any kind, even when it's directed at the university."

At Harvard University, scene of angry student protests a year ago, a visitor found a similar outlook. "Students seem to be moving away from a diffuse discontent and toward a rediscovery of the values of workmanship," said the master of Eliot House, Alan E. Heimert. "It's as if they were saying, 'The revolution isn't right around the corner, so I'd better find my vocation and develop myself.' "

Bruce Chalmers, master of Winthrop House, saw "a kind of antitoxin in students' blood" resulting from the 1969 disorders: "The disruptiveness, emotional intensity, and loss of time and opportunity last year," he said, "have convinced people that, whatever happens, we must avoid replaying that scenario."

A student found even more measurable evidence of the new mood: "At Lamont Library last week I had to wait 45 minutes to get a reserve book. Last spring, during final exams, there was no wait at all."



Despite the scare headlines, a mood of cautious optimism

1980! PARTIALLY UNDERLYING THE CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM is a feeling that many colleges and universities—which, having been peaceful places for decades, were unprepared and vulnerable when the first disruptions struck—have learned a lot in a short time.

Many colleges have learned a lot from the disruptions

When they returned to many campuses last fall, students were greeted with what *The Chronicle of Higher Education* called "a combination of stern warnings against disruptions and conciliatory moves aimed at giving students a greater role in campus governance."

Codes of discipline had been revised, and special efforts had been made to acquaint students with them. Security forces had been strengthened. Many institutions made it clear that they were willing to seek court injunctions and would call the police if necessary to keep the peace.

Equally important, growing numbers of institutions were recognizing that, behind the stridencies of protest, many student grievances were indeed legitimate. The institutions demonstrated (not merely talked about) a new readiness to introduce reforms. While, in the early days of campus disruptions, some colleges and universities made *ad hoc* concessions to demonstrators under the threat and reality of violence, more and more now began to take the initiative of reform, themselves.

The chancellor of the State University of New York, Samuel B. Gould, described the challenge:

"America's institutions of higher learning . . . must do more than make piecemeal concessions to change. They must do more than merely defend themselves.

"They must take the initiative, take it in such a way that there is never a doubt as to what they intend to achieve and how all the components of the institutions will be involved in achieving it. They must call together their keenest minds and their most humane souls to sit and probe and question and plan and discard and replan—until a new concept of the university emerges, one which will fit today's needs but will have its major thrust toward tomorrow's."

1980! IF THEY ARE TO ARRIVE AT THAT DATE in improved condition, however, more and more colleges and universities—and their constituencies—seem to be saying they must work out their reforms in an atmosphere of calm and reason.

Cornell University's vice-president for public affairs, Steven Muller ("My temperament has always been more activist than scholarly"), put it thus before the American Political Science Association:

The need now: to work on reform, calmly, reasonably

"The introduction of force into the university violates the very essence of academic freedom, which in its broadest sense is the freedom to inquire, and openly to proclaim and test conclusions resulting from inquiry. . . .

"It should be possible within the university to gain attention and to make almost any point and to persuade others by the use of reason. Even if this is not always true, it is possible to accomplish these ends by nonviolent and by noncoercive means.

"Those who choose to employ violence or coercion within the university cannot long remain there without destroying the whole fabric